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Introduction
Oil prices have changed substantially over the last three decades. Researchers have considered many explanations to account for the long-run behavior of prices, including growing demand from emerging economies, noncompetitive behavior of OPEC, resource depletion, and rising extraction costs. To understand which factors are paramount in driving the oil price requires the estimation of cost and demand parameters under di¤erent market structures. Because supply relations and demand function are likely to move simultaneously as a result of exogenous shifters (like income and technological factors), econometric methods such as instrumental variables should be used to estimate these parameters. Unfortunately, the application of these methods to the oil market has proven di¢ cult. 1 We use the dominant …rm-competitive fringe textbook model (OPEC versus the group of non-OPEC producers) and estimate signi…cant elasticities over the sample period 1986-2009 that correct for the simultaneity bias by using standard IV methods. We show that it is critical to correctly specify the market structure to obtain signi…cant elasticities, and document that OPEC exercised market power during the sample period 1986-2009.
In our model, demand is standard -it depends on the current oil price and world GDP -but we depart from standard supply analysis by assuming that one group of oil producers, OPEC, can exert market power, whereas the non-OPEC oil producers act as a competitive fringe. Once OPEC sets the price of oil, total demand and the fringe's supply are determined, and OPEC is faced with the residual demand: total demand less the competitive supply. OPEC sets the price that maximizes its total pro…ts, taking into account the impact of its pricing decision on the residual demand. This choice leads to a nonlinear price-setting rule. We use quarterly data from 1986 to 2009 and estimate a simultaneous system of three equations, using nonlinear instrumental variable methods with world GDP and production costs for OPEC and non-OPEC producers as exogenous demand and supply shifters. Our results suggest that the nonlinearity induced by OPEC's markup is of key importance in modeling oil prices.
Our results suggest that the dominant …rm model provides a fair representation of the oil market: all structural parameters have the expected sign and are statistically signi…cant (except for the marginal cost elasticity of OPEC). We estimate a long-run price elasticity of demand of 0:34, which is somewhat larger than previous estimates reported in the literature; see, for example, Dahl (1993) , Gately and Huntington (2002) , and Cooper (2003) . Our estimate of the income elasticity of demand is 1.11, which is higher than previous estimates, see, for example, the Gately and Huntington 2002 study (0.55 for OECD countries and 1.17 for non-OECD countries including China and India) and Graham and Glaister (2004) . This result partly re ‡ects the high GDP growth rates of China and India during most years of our 1986-2009 data period, which is not a feature in most of the previous studies. We …nd a non-OPEC supply elasticity of 0.31, and further that the marginal cost of oil production is lower for OPEC than for non-OPEC producers.
Because the demand and non-OPEC supply elasticities are statistically signi…cant, we obtain a tight estimate for the degree of OPEC's market power-we …nd evidence that OPEC exerted substantial market power in the period analyzed.
To gain insight about the role of OPEC's markup for our estimation results, we reestimate the model under the assumption that OPEC is a price taker. With a competitive model we obtain an insigni…cant (and marginally positive) demand elasticity-a similar result has been obtained in some previous studies, such as Lin (2011) . Using the competitive model we also obtain a lower income elasticity (around 0.5) and …nd an insigni…cant factor price elasticity for OPEC. The di¤erence between the results obtained from the competitive model and the dominant …rm model re ‡ects the nonlinear response induced by OPEC's markup on its residual demand. In our model OPEC's markup is not a constant; it is a function of parameters (to be estimated) and endogenous variables.
Using our estimates, we examine the contribution of world GDP and production costs to the long-run trend in oil prices and quantities during our sample period from 1986 to 2009. We …nd that changes in world GDP explain most of the growth in oil prices and quantities, but the recent rise in production costs is also responsible for higher prices after 2004.
We make three contributions to the literature on crude oil prices. First, there is a large literature on estimating the relationship between oil demand and the price of oil and also the relationship between supply of oil and the price of oil; see, for example, Gri¢ n (1985), Kaufmann (04), Hansen and Lindholt (08), Kaufmann et al. (2008) , and Bremond et al. (2012) . These papers do not account for the simultaneity of supply-and-demand changes. Hamilton (2009) argues that for some periods these estimates are probably good approximations, but in general they are subject to instabilities. Studies that have taken an instrumental variables approach, as we do, are scarce-some examples are Alhajji and Huettner (2000), Almoguera and Herrera (2007) , and Lin (2011) . We contribute to this literature by providing statistically signi…cant demand and supply elasticities using a simple nonlinear system IV estimator.
Second, our paper is related to the literature that tests di¤erent market structures in the oil market; more speci…cally, the degree to which OPEC can control prices. Gri¢ n (1985) is a seminal paper in this …eld. In testing whether OPEC is a cartel, Gri¢ n starts out assuming that OPEC is a dominant …rm that sets the price of oil. However, the residual demand function, as well as a …rst-order condition for OPEC, are not part of the empirical model. Alhajji and Huettner (2000) and Hansen and Lindholt (2008) also refer to the dominant …rm model, but once again, OPEC's price-setting rule is not part of the empirical model in these papers. To the best of our knowledge, the present paper is the …rst one to estimate the simultaneous dominant …rm model for the oil market. Third, using the model's parameters we show that growth in world GDP has been the main driving force of oil price increases over the last two decades, but that recently rising production costs have contributed signi…cantly to higher oil prices. To the best of our knowledge, we are the …rst to document the relative importance of demand and supply factors for the long-run behavior of oil price. In contrast, some studies, like Kilian (2009), assume that supply is …xed, which is reasonable in the short run. Our paper also complements results from the empirical industrial organization literature on measuring the degree of market power, see Suslow (1986) for a study on the market power in the aluminium industry and Bresnahan (1989) for a survey of the literature.
Our paper is divided into six sections. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the crude oil market, and in Section 3 we describe the empirical framework used to estimate the model. The main results are presented in Section 4. Here we compare our estimated elasticities to those reported in the literature and discuss the …t of the model. We also analyze the relative importance of world income and costs of extraction as the driving forces of the oil price. In Section 5 we perform a number of robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
The Crude Oil Market
In this section we describe the data sources and characterize the crude oil market, focusing mainly on the period that will be analyzed later in the paper.
Data
We use quarterly data for the period 1986:Q1 3 Both series cover costs of exploration, development and production.
For non-OPEC production costs we use U.S. costs of production, which we believe is a conservative estimate: among the non-OPEC producers, U.S. producers have the highest cost, see Alhajji and Huettner (2000) . The source for the non-OPEC cost of production is U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2012b), which compiles a Producer Price Index for production costs in the United States. We set the nominal production cost for non-OPEC suppliers to 10 dollars per barrel in 1999:Q2 (IHS CERA, 2000). Like Kaufmann (2004) and Kaufmann et al. (2008) , we also use data for OPEC's installed extraction capacity; these are obtained from Kaufmann (2005) . Finally, we used the quarterly world GDP index from Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001) and transformed the GDP index into levels using annual GDP from the World Bank (2013). The series is de ‡ated by the U.S. CPI.
Development in the oil market
In this subsection we describe the main development in the global oil market since 1973, and also relate this to economic development. Panel (a) in Figure 1 is beyond the scope of the present article to discuss this early period -the price path in this period probably re ‡ects structural shocks on the supply side. Rather, our focus centers on the period after 1985, which we believe is characterized by less abrupt changes in the crude oil market. 2 Ideally, we would have used the change in world stock of crude oil, but we do not have these data. Because the change in the OECD stock of crude oil amounts to roughly one percent of world crude oil extraction, we believe our approximation of total demand for crude oil is good. 3 The last series was obtained from Lars Lindholt.
As seen from panel (a), the real oil price was roughly in the range of 15 to 25 USD per barrel from 1986 to 1998, except for the peak in 1990:Q3-1991:Q1, a rise that can be attributed to supply disruptions stemming from the Gulf War. Beginning in 1999, the oil price increased steadily and peaked at 88 USD per barrel in 2008:Q2, then dropped to around 40 USD due to the …nancial crisis.
Panel (b) shows that total production of oil has increased steadily after 1985. In this period, non-OPEC production did not change much, but there was a drop in production in the early 1990s, re ‡ecting the contraction of the energy industry in the former Soviet
Union. The two plots in panel (b) imply that the OPEC's market share increased from 30 percent in 1986 to 40 percent in 1992 (see Figure 1 panel (c)), where it has largely remained since then. Therefore, it seems reasonable to study the 1986 to 2009 period under the assumption of a constant income elasticity. We return to this issue in Section 5.
Empirical Models for the Crude Oil Market
In this section we present two structural models for the crude oil market that di¤er in the degree to which OPEC exerts market power. We start by describing the building blocks common to both models, such as world demand and the non-OPEC competitive supply.
Then, for the competitive model we assume that OPEC takes the price as given. Finally, we introduce the dominant …rm model where OPEC sets the price of oil.
Theoretical framework
Consider the inverse demand function for oil,
where P is the real price of oil, Q w is world (w) demand for oil, Y is (real) world GDP and V w is a measure of other factors that may have impact on demand for oil.
We assume there are two groups of oil producers, OPEC countries (o) and non-OPEC countries (no). The latter group is assumed to be price takers, and thus its …rst-order condition, derived from pro…t maximization, requires that the oil price is equal to the marginal cost (M C) of production:
Here, Q no is non-OPEC production, which we assume has an increasing marginal cost, W no is the input cost for non-OPEC producers and V no contains other factors that may have impact on non-OPEC supply of oil.
Below we consider two alternative hypotheses for OPEC production: (i) OPEC has market power (the benchmark case) and (ii) OPEC is a price taker. In the latter case, the …rst-order condition for OPEC is of course similar to (2):
where
is OPEC production (
Alternatively, OPEC is not a price taker. This hypothesis takes into consideration that OPEC's production has an impact on the price of oil: if OPEC production increases, then, ceteris paribus, the price of oil will decrease, and therefore non-OPEC extraction will decrease. Formally, equation (2) can be rewritten as
which implicitly de…nes the function
OPEC maximizes pro…ts, taking (5) into account, that is, OPEC maximizes
is the total cost of OPEC production. Under the assumption of an internal solution, that is, positive production from both OPEC and non-OPEC producers, OPEC's …rst-order condition can be speci…ed as price should be a markup above marginal cost,
where the markup m is de…ned as
Here, = @P @Q w
is the supply elasticity of non-OPEC producers, and
Q w is OPEC's market share of production. The markup's numerator is negative, and hence the denominator also has to be negative in order to ensure a positive markup. Note that
where o is the elasticity of the residual demand facing OPEC. 4 Because an internal solution of the OPEC optimization problem requires o < 1 (in equilibrium), the corresponding requirement of the markup is m > 1; our parameter estimates meet this condition, see Section 4.1.1. The markup is, ceteris paribus, increasing 4 The elasticity of the residual demand facing OPEC is
in s o and , but decreasing in : Because the markup is nonlinear in the parameters to be estimated, a nonlinear methodology is required.
An alternative representation (see Bresnahan (1982) ) of the …rst-order condition, which we will use later, is given by
where is referred to as the market power index. This index embeds several cases: = 0 corresponds to perfect competition, = 1 corresponds to monopoly, and 0 < < 1 corresponds to intermediate cases like Cournot competition and a dominant …rm with a competitive fringe (our benchmark case). 5 
Empirical Implementation
Under both market structures (dominant …rm and competitive), we have a simultaneous system of equations that determines oil production in OPEC and non-OPEC countries, total oil production, and the world price of oil. To …t the model to the data, the next step is to incorporate speci…c functional forms.
Speci…cation
Our empirical goal is to estimate long-run elasticity parameters for supply and demand.
To deal with potential cointegration in the data (because we use levels), we proceed in two steps. First, in Appendix A.1 we establish that the data is nonstationary and that there are multiple cointegrated relationships among our dependent variables. Second, as suggested by Stock and Watson (1993) , we use dynamic OLS and augment our empirical model with a vector of lagged di¤erences of independent variables to obtain e¢ cient statistical tests.
We assume that world (w) demand for oil is given by a log-linear function:
where t is time, D i t is a vector of dummies, i = w; no; o; and u i t is an error term assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero mean and variance 2 i . V i t is a 5 As pointed out in Bresnahan (1982) , if both demand and marginal cost are linear in quantity, then estimation of a relation of type (8) will identify the gross e¤ect of quantity, which consists of two terms: the unit cost of OPEC production and the factor @P @Q w : Hence, it is not possible to identify . vector of (demand or supply) shifters; V w t may, for example, include lagged di¤erences of ln Y . Demand theory suggests that 1 = < 0 and 2 > 0:
The non-OPEC group is a price taker, and they therefore set marginal cost equal to price, see equation (2) . Assuming that marginal cost is log-linear 6 , the supply of non-OPEC production is also log-linear:
where 1 = > 0 and 2 < 0 according to standard economic theory.
Also for OPEC we assume that marginal cost is log-linear. We consider two alternative hypotheses for OPEC (see Section 3.1). First, OPEC acts competitively, and thus its supply function is given by
Alternatively, OPEC acts as a dominant …rm with a competitive fringe-the non-OPEC suppliers. Then, quantity is set so that the price exceeds the marginal cost of production. Using equations (6), (7), (10), and (11), we obtain
It is crucial that the markup is a nonlinear function of the parameters 1 and 1 . The model is therefore nonlinear in the parameters to be estimated-this topic is explored in the next subsection.
Using the speci…ed functional forms, the market power index becomes (see (9))
We will use this expression to measure the degree of market power exerted by OPEC.
Estimation Methods
In this subsection we describe how we estimate the parameters under the two alternative market structures. First, in the competitive model where OPEC is a price taker, we estimate the structural parameters
c ] using equations (10), (11) and (12) where (10), (11) and (13) where
. In both cases, the vector of instrument variables is
When OPEC is assumed to be a price taker, the moment condition function g( c ) is de…ned as
where X w ; X no , and X o c are vectors of the right-hand side variables in equations (10), (11) and (12), respectively. When estimating this system of three equations, we use three-stage least squares (3SLS). The parameter estimates b c are obtained by solving
where the weighting matrix c W is evaluated at (Z 0 Z) 1 in the …rst step and at (Z
in the second step, and
Because this model is linear, system general method of moments (GMM) estimation is equivalent to 3SLS. 7 When estimating the dominant …rm model, we use system nonlinear instrumental variable method (henceforth referred to as NLIV) with the moment condition function
where X o d is the vector of the right-hand side variables in equation (13) except the markup. The weighting matrix is evaluated at (Z 0 Z) 1 . Furthermore, we also impose the constraint 7 We have
N is the covariance matrix of the residuals from 2SLS where N is the number of observations. The variance matrix can be obtained from 
Results
In this section we present the paper's main results. First, we show the estimated elasticities for the dominant …rm model (our benchmark) and compare these with the estimates from the competitive model. Then, we explore the …t of the dominant …rm model and identify which factor has been the main driver of the crude oil price. Third, we provide evidence for OPEC's exertion of market power during the 1986-2009 period.
Elasticities
Below we report the estimates from our two speci…cations. The second column in Table 1 shows our estimates for the dominant …rm modelequations (10), (11) and (13) -using the nonlinear instrumental variable method. The third column in Table 1 shows the estimates from the competitive model -equations (10), (11) and (12) -using 3SLS. We use the same instruments and dummy variables as in the estimation of the dominant …rm model. Table 1 also presents an overidenti…cation test for the instruments Z t for the dominant …rm model. To test for the validity of the instruments, we use the Sargan-Hansen J-statistic, which equals the value of the GMM objective function evaluated at the estimated parameters. We …nd a value of the J-statistic of 4.12. The critical value of the chi-square distribution with 45 degrees of 8 The variance of this estimator is given by
The war dummy equals 1 for the period of the Iran-Iraq war 1986:Q1-1988:Q2 and also 1 during the invasion of Kuwait (1990III-IV), and is zero otherwise. The former Soviet Union dummy equals 1 for the period 1986:Q1-1990:Q2, re ‡ecting the contraction of the energy industry in this country during that period, and zero otherwise. Our model assumes that these wars/events have impact on all production decisions. 10 We use the same number of lags in both the dominant …rm and the competitive model (q = 4); see Section 5 for a discussion on the importance of lags wrt. the estimation results. freedom is 61.7 at the 5% signi…cance level. Hence, we can not reject the null hypothesis of appropriate speci…cation and validity of the instruments.
OPEC as the dominant …rm
Price elasticity of oil demand. The crude oil demand elasticity is estimated to be 0:34 (The standard error is 0.02). It is not easy to compare this estimate with previous studies because these are based on di¤erent data, techniques, and periods: all these factors may lead to di¤erent estimates. Early studies by Dahl and Yücel (1991) like we do) and they use other data for cost of production for OPEC and non-OPEC than we do. Second, by omitting the OPEC price-setting equation in their estimation they do not take into account the e¤ect of the endogenous variables on OPEC's markup.
To illustrate the importance of the estimation strategy, we have reestimated our model equation by equation. With OLS the estimated demand elasticity is 0:00 (0.01), whereas we obtain 0:01 (0.01) with IV (when the same instruments as in the benchmark case is used). These results clearly show the importance of specifying the market structure.
Income elasticity. We obtain an income elasticity of demand of 1.11 (The standard error is 0.16). Most previous studies report an income elasticity that is less than one for the 1971-1997 period for di¤erent types of countries. In that study, the average income elasticity for 25 OECD countries is 0.55, but 1.17 for 11 non-OECD countries characterized by rapid income growth, and 1.11 for 11 oil-exporting countries. This suggests that income elasticities are greater than one for several non-OECD countries, and may therefore partly explain why our estimate, which is based on data for all countries, exceeds one. However, other reasons why we obtain such a high income elasticity may be related to the data period, type of data and number of lags; see the discussion in Section 5.
Non-OPEC supply. For non-OPEC producers we obtain a supply elasticity of 0.31 (the standard error is 0.04), meaning that a one percent increase in the crude oil price will increase extraction from the non-OPEC producers by 0.31 percent. There are not many estimates of the non-OPEC supply elasticity in the literature. One exception is the Alhajji and Huettner (2000) study that obtained 0.29, which is close to our result. Turning to the factor price supply elasticity of non-OPEC, our estimate is 1:35 (the standard error is 0.39) that is, a one percent increase in the unit cost of extraction leads to a slightly greater reduction in non-OPEC production.
OPEC price-setting equation. We estimate a marginal cost elasticity for OPEC ( 20) . However, we can still examine whether the marginal cost elasticities of OPEC and non-OPEC di¤er: a simple one-sided t-test suggests that at …ve percent signi…cance level the marginal cost elasticity is larger for non-OPEC than for OPEC. This could be due to competitive advantages since reserves are more accessible and cheaper to exploit in OPEC than in non-OPEC countries.
The insigni…cant marginal cost elasticity of OPEC may re ‡ect omitted explanatory variables or poor data. For example, although the data on OPEC production costs cover exploration, extraction and production, the data may not adequately re ‡ect the geology of the oil …elds like costs of new …elds relative to costs of …elds under extraction. Alternatively, the insigni…cant marginal cost elasticity may re ‡ect a serious misspecifaction as the model does not allow for dynamic behavior; for example, a higher OPEC capacity may be taken as a signal by non-OPEC producers of a permanent increase in future OPEC production. Such a signal may trigger a change in the non-OPEC extraction path, which may cause a response by OPEC.
The OPEC factor price elasticity (
is estimated to 1.08 (the standard error is 0.22). If OPEC production increases, then, ceteris paribus, the market price will fall, which will lower non-OPEC production, thereby modifying the initial price reduction.
We call this equilibrium e¤ect the OPEC production elasticity (
, and it is straightforward to identify it in our framework: our estimate is 0:76 (the standard error is 0.06). 11 The estimate of the market power index is 0.65, which is clearly above zero.
Moreover, the market power index estimate is sharply estimated -its standard error is 11 Notice that
The equilibrium elasticity is evaluated at the mean of the OPEC market share s o . The standard error is computed using the delta method. Note that b o = 1 0:76 < 1 at equilibrium.
0.04. 12 These results suggest that OPEC exerts market power; we will return to this issue in Section 4.3.
Finally, using our estimated parameters we …nd that OPEC's markup varies between 2.0 and 8.6 with a mean of 4.6, that is, far above one, which is consistent with theory. 13 
OPEC as a Competitive Supplier
We now turn to the estimation of the competitive model: by comparing the benchmark model with the competitive model we can quantify the misspeci…cation bias induced by not accounting for OPEC taking into consideration that non-OPEC supply depends on OPEC's level of production, see equation (5) . The competitive model is estimated using 3SLS.
Demand. As seen from the last column in Table 1 , the demand elasticity has the wrong sign, but it is low and insigni…cant; 0.01 (0.01) versus 0:34 (0.02) in the benchmark case.
14 In the competitive model the estimated income elasticity is 0.50 (0.02), which is much smaller than the 1.11 estimate in the benchmark case. This suggests that not accounting for the non-competitive market structure in the speci…cation of the econometric model leads to bias in the estimates of the demand elasticity and income elasticity.
Non-OPEC supply. The supply elasticity of non-OPEC is estimated to 0.11 (0.01), which is smaller than in the dominant …rm model (0.31). Likewise, the factor price elasticity of non-OPEC is also smaller (in absolute value) when OPEC is assumed to act competitively ( 0:39) than in the benchmark case ( 1:35).
OPEC supply. When OPEC is assumed to act competitively, its estimated supply elasticity is 0.17 (0.04), which is small but somewhat higher than the supply elasticity of non-OPEC (0.11). The factor price elasticity of OPEC is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
In summary, the insigni…cant factor price elasticity of OPEC, as well as the insignificant demand elasticity, should cast doubt about the use of the competitive model and also the use of linear (in logs) models when modeling oil prices. In the remaining part of the paper we therefore focus on the dominant …rm model. 12 The market power index is evaluated at the mean of the OPEC market share s o . The standard error is computed using the delta method. 13 Recall that in our estimation we have imposed that the markup is strictly positive. Our point estimates clearly meet this restriction. 14 The estimate of the demand elasticity in the competitive model can be compared with Krichene (2006) , who estimates a simultaneous equations model for world crude oil demand and competitive oil supply. Krichene applies 2SLS to estimate short-run elasticities, and error-correction methods (ECM) to estimate the long-run demand elasticity using annual data from 1970 to 2005. He …nds the demand elasticity to vary across countries, ranging from 0:03 to 0:08, which roughly resembles our result for the competitive model; no price e¤ect on demand.
Fit of the Dominant Firm Model
Using the estimated parameters of the dominant …rm model, we evaluate the …t of the model using the exogenous variables for the 1986-2009 period. Then, we perform two counterfactual experiments to explore the relative importance of income and cost when explaining the long-run trends of price and quantities.
In-sample prediction. Figure 5 shows the in-sample prediction of the dominant …rm model. In general, the model tracks the main trends in the market reasonably well but understandably misses some deviations from the trend. In particular, the dominant …rm We now examine which exogenous factor-world GDP or costs-contributes most to the trends in consumption, non-OPEC supply, and the oil price predicted by the benchmark model. Each panel in Figure 6 shows three curves. The solid curves are the predicted paths of quantities and prices, obtained using the estimates of the benchmark model and the paths of all exogenous variables. The two other curves are derived from counterfactual experiments. First, we set the level of world GDP to be constant over time 
OPEC' s Market Power
So far we have documented that OPEC's market power index is high -the estimate of is 0.65 (at the mean value of the market shares) with 0.04 as the standard deviation, see Table 1 . This clearly suggests that OPEC has market power. A simple approach to assess the market power of OPEC is to calculate the standard Lerner index L t . Using equation (8) we …nd
We …nd that the Lerner index had a positive trend between 1986 (51 percent) and 1998 (82 percent). This trend is entirely driven by changes in OPEC's market share because in our model the elasticities are constant. Note that
, that is, the absolute value of the OPEC production elasticity increased over time in this period.
After 1998, the Lerner index varied between 71 percent and 88 percent. For the entire 1986-2009 period, the average Lerner index was 76 percent.
Is it possible to test whether OPEC has market power? Here there is a fundamental problem because the dominant …rm model does not nest the competitive case; we have assumed that OPEC is a dominant …rm that takes into consideration how the fringe responds to its production decisions, as shown in equation (5) . Hence, = 0 is not de…ned in our dominant …rm model.
We can, however, compute con…dence intervals for the market power index, which will
give information about OPEC's degree of market power, in particular how far the market power index is from zero. Because the market power index is nonlinear in the parameters and is not de…ned at zero, we rely on bootstrap methods to compute its sampling distribution. In particular, we compute con…dence intervals using quantiles from the empirical sampling distribution. First, we use re-sampling methods for the residuals to generate bootstrap data. In each iteration j, j = 1; : : : ; 10000, we keep the exogenous variables …xed as in the data, and recompute the endogenous variables [ln Q w t ; ln Q no t ; ln P t ] : Then, for each iteration we estimate the model and use equation (14) to compute b j ( denotes the estimate from the bootstrap process), see Appendix A.2 for more details. The set of all b j is the empirical distribution of b . Finally, we construct the 99th percentile con…-dence interval (one for each year) using the bootstrap sampling distribution of b : Figure   7 , which shows the con…dence intervals for the market power index, reveals a signi…cant degree of OPEC market power. In particular, for the entire sample period the lower ends of the 99th percentile con…dence intervals are by far above zero.
To test our benchmark dominant …rm model against the competitive alternative model, we use a non-nested statistical test of Smith (1992) for competing models estimated by generalized method of moments. Consider two competing hypotheses. Let 
where 
where Using the estimates from the Section 4.1.1 (see Table 1 ), we compute the Cox-type statistic under the hypothesis H d using equation (15) . We obtain a value for the statistic of 0:086. We then compute the standard deviation using equation (16) 
Further Analysis
We now examine how our estimates change with respect to di¤erent econometric speci…-cations and data used. First, we explore the robustness of our estimates when we allow for di¤erent lags in the correction term. Second, we investigate how the estimates vary between subperiods. This may shed light on parameter shifts due to structural changes in demand and supply. Third, we study the impact of assuming that consumer prices di¤er from producer price. Fourth, we check whether our estimates change when we use OECD data instead of world data. We use this exercise to compare with previous studies that have used OECD data. Finally, we assume that only a few OPEC countries -OPEC core -exert market power, whereas all other OPEC member states are de facto price takers. 15 Recall their variances are c = var T 
Lags
It is standard to include lags in oil market studies; for example, Hansen In the benchmark case we used four lags (one year). Table 3 
Data period
In our estimations, we assumed constant parameter values over the data period 1986:Q1-2009:Q4. This may be a strong assumption because of structural changes in demand and supply. For example, over time a higher share of crude oil has been used in the transportation sector, which, according to several studies, has a lower demand elasticity than other oil-consuming sectors like the manufacturing industry and power generation.
Similarly, rapid growth in some Asian countries has increased this region's share of global oil consumption-these countries may have a di¤erent demand structure than OECD countries, and also a higher income elasticity of oil, see the discussion related to 2. For OPEC, the energy and environmental policy in OECD countries, and also discoveries of unconventional petroleum deposits in non-OPEC countries, may have a powerful impact on its ability to act as a pro…t-maximizing cartel, which may trigger structural supply changes.
To investigate the variation in the parameters across periods, we divide the data period into two subperiods; 1986-1997 and 1998-2009 , and estimate the benchmark model separately for each of these subperiods, see Table 4 . When splitting the original time period into two subperiods, the two estimates of the demand elasticity do not di¤er much 
The consumer price of oil
In the analysis we have used the crude oil price as an explanatory variable for both oil producers and oil consumers; this is standard in the literature. However, consumers face a much higher price of oil than producers; the di¤erence re ‡ects costs (and pro…ts) of re…neries, costs (and pro…ts) of transport of crude oil and oil products, and taxes (value added, energy and environmental taxes, etc.). By using the (weighted) consumer price of oil products as an explanatory variable, our estimated demand elasticity becomes comparable to econometric studies on the demand elasticity.
Energy Prices and Taxes from the IEA provides information on consumer prices of oil products, and Energy Statistics of OECD countries, also from the IEA, contains data on consumption of oil products. Using these sources we construct an OECD consumer oil price where we aggregate over sectors (households, services, industry and transport) and oil products (light fuel oil, heavy fuel oil and automotive diesel). Figure 8 shows the di¤erence between the OECD consumer price of oil and the crude oil price (in 1996 USD). In 1986 the di¤erence was around 55 USD per barrel, and it increased to around 65 USD in the …rst part of the 1990s. Later, it fell to 50 USD before it peaked at 80 USD in 2007. Roughly, the OECD consumer price of oil is twice as high as the crude oil price.
Ideally, we should use a weighted average of the consumer prices of oil products for OECD countries and non-OECD countries when estimating demand for oil. Energy Prices and Taxes provides detailed price information for all OECD countries (see discussion above), but the information on non-OECD countries is by far too limited to be of practical use for the present paper. While the consumer prices of oil products may di¤er between OECD and non-OECD, for example due to di¤erent tax levels, the changes in consumer prices may not di¤er that much between the OECD and the non-OECD; they both depend on the crude oil price, costs of re…neries, costs of transport, etc. Table 5 shows the estimates when we use the OECD consumer price of oil (instead of the crude oil price) as an explanatory variable. 16 For most elasticities the change is moderate; the demand elasticity is now -0.45 (-0.34 in the benchmark case), the non-OPEC supply elasticity is 0.18 (0.31 in the benchmark case), and the market power index is 0.81 (0.65 in the benchmark case).
OECD countries
Above, we pooled all countries in the world to examine the relationship between global consumption of oil, world GDP, and the price of oil. Due to lack of data, some earlier studies used OECD oil consumption and/or OECD GDP instead of global oil consumption and global GDP to estimate elasticities; see, for example, Alhajji and Huettner (2000) and Almoguera and Herrera (2007) .
In order to shed some light on what kind of biases the use of OECD data may cause, in Table 6 we have reestimated our benchmark model with OECD data for oil consumption and GDP. As seen from Table 6 , for the non-OPEC supply elasticities the results for the two cases do not di¤er much, whereas for demand and OPEC elasticities, as well as the market power index, the di¤erence is large. In particular, the demand elasticity is -0.18 with OECD data, which is much lower (in absolute value) than the -0.34 estimate obtained with global data. Similarly, with OECD data the income elasticity is 0.47, whereas we obtained 1.11 with global data. These results illustrate the importance of using global data.
OPEC core
So far we have assumed that OPEC is a coordinated group facing a competitive fringe.
However, several papers have pointed out that OPEC countries are heterogeneous and should be analyzed accordingly. Mabro (1998) In Section 2 we explained that we do not have country-speci…c cost data, only cost of production for an OPEC country and cost of production for a non OPEC country (both vary over time). We therefore assume that cost of production of the new fringe consists of a weighted average of cost of production of a non-OPEC country and cost of production of an (original) OPEC country (with weights equal to the production share of the non-OPEC countries and the production share of the non-core OPEC countriesthese add up to one); below this case is referred to as OPEC core. To test the robustness of this cost assumption, we have also examined the case where a non-core OPEC country has the same cost of production as a non-OPEC country; below this case is referred to as OPEC core -homogeneous. Table 7 shows the results. For the price elasticity, the estimate from the OPEC core model (-0.10) is clearly lower than in the benchmark case (-0.34). Also the income elasticity is much lower in the OPEC core model (0.69) than in the benchmark case (1.11). A lower price elasticity tends to reduce the market power index, see (14), but on the other hand a lower OPEC market share (re ‡ecting fewer OPEC producers) has the opposite e¤ect. As seen from Table 7 , the …rst e¤ect dominates; the market index in the benchmark case (0.65) is twice as high as in the OPEC core model (0.31). From Table 7 we also see that the estimates in the two OPEC core models are rather similar. Therefore, the di¤erence in the market power index is moderate (0.31 versus 0.39 in OPEC corehomogeneous.
To understand why the estimates of the OPEC core model di¤er from the benchmark estimates, remember that in the benchmark case all OPEC members belong to the dominant …rm, whereas in the OPEC core model the dominant …rm consists of four OPEC countries only. Hence, a number of oil producing countries have changed strategic position from taking into account the response of the fringe to being part of the fringe. This means that if the dominant …rm reduces the oil price, there will be a larger (quantity)
response from the fringe in the OPEC core model than in the benchmark case simply because the fringe is larger in the OPEC core model. For the same reason, the choke price of the residual demand curve is lower in the OPEC core model than in the benchmark case: If, hypothetically, the choke price in the benchmark case is charged by the dominant …rm in the OPEC core model, supply from the fringe would exceed demand. Hence, the residual demand curve shifts downwards (lower choke price) and becomes more price elastic (larger response from the fringe). Standard economic theory then suggests that the degree of market power declines, which is in accordance with our …nding.
Conclusions
Oil prices have changed dramatically over the last decade. Since the work of Gri¢ n (1985), di¤erent studies have tested a variety of market structures using di¤erent econometric techniques, data, and models. The results have been mixed, with parameters not being robust to the speci…cation of the model or the sample period, or simply insigni…cant.
In particular, the demand elasticity has proven di¢ cult to estimate reliably.
In this paper we estimate a parsimonious dominant …rm model for the global crude oil market. OPEC is envisioned to be a dominant …rm, setting its price as a markup over residual demand, and non-OPEC countries act as a competitive fringe. The model is estimated using a system of three equations with OPEC's price response being nonlinear (in logs).
We …nd signi…cant estimates for most of the long-run parameters of the model. In particular, signi…cant demand and non-OPEC elasticities allow us to measure the degree of OPEC's market power. We …nd evidence that OPEC exerted substantial market power between 1986 and 2009, the period analyzed in this paper. Then, using the same data but instead assuming that OPEC is a competitive producer, we reestimated the model and compared its …t to the data. We …nd that the competitive model does not capture the speci…c characteristics of the global oil market. In particular, it fails to obtain signi…cant demand and supply elasticities. We conclude that the linear (in logs) competitive system may lead to a misspeci…cation bias. Using the parameters of the dominant …rm model, we show that world GDP has been the main driving force of oil prices over the last two decades. Furthermore, rising production costs have contributed to an increase in oil prices after 2004.
The results in this paper suggest some avenues for further research. First, we used a static model augmented by dynamic factors (lag structure) and lagged OPEC capacity.
For the dominant …rm model we …nd that the estimated elasticity of marginal cost of OPEC with respect to lagged OPEC capacity (
) is 2:42 with an estimated standard error of 1.07. Hence, this parameter is signi…cant at the 5 percent test level.
Therefore, a dynamic approach to understand the role of capacity seems a natural step.
One strand of the literature, which builds on Hotelling (1931) , singles out resource depletion as the dynamic factor to explain the path of oil prices. However, attempts to explain long-run prices by focusing on resource scarcity, see, for example, Pindyck (1978) , Lin (2010) , and Jovanovic (2013), have had limited success; this may re ‡ect the fact that the size of oil reserves has not changed much over the last 30 years -new discoveries have compensated for current extraction (Smith, 2009 ). An alternative strategy to incorporate resource depletion would be to add dynamics to demand -due to …nancial or inventory speculation -or to supply -due to a game between OPEC and non-OPEC where producers (also) choose investment in extraction capacity. This would add persistency and volatility to prices, thereby providing a foundation for the model to account for the big swings in prices after 2000. Note, however, that a game between OPEC and non-OPEC may require detailed data on costs of production for each OPEC country; we have no access to such data.
Finally, it could be interesting to relax some of the common assumptions used in time series analysis of the oil market, like …xed supply, and specify a cointegration framework with simultaneous demand and supply.
A. Appendix
A.1 Cointegration tests
As mentioned in the main text, to ensure that we describe stable long-run relationships we …rst perform a cointegration analysis of the data. We show that …ve out of the six variables used in the estimation are non-stationary. Then, we establish that there are up to four cointegration relationships in the data. To test variables for unit root we employ the augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. In particular, we assess a null hypothesis of a unit root process for the variable. We estimate for each variable y t in Table 8 the relationship y t = 0 + y t 1 + 1 4y t 1 + 2 4y t 2 + :::
where all the s are parameters and p is the number of lags. This relationship is tested against the following alternative model:
where is the deterministic trend coe¢ cient, and ( < 1) is the autocorrelation coe¢ cient.
Panel (a) in Table 8 shows the ADF statistics for the six variables used in the estimation. At the 5 percent signi…cance level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for non-OPEC production, oil price, world GDP, non-OPEC cost, and OPEC cost.
In contrast, the ADF statistics for world consumption rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root.
Next, we test for common trends among the six variables using Johansen's unrestricted cointegration rank test (trace test in a vector error-correction model (VECM). In particular, we construct a vector errorcorrection model with q lags:
The null hypothesis is that of no cointegration, that is, r = 0 where r is the rank of B. If we reject the null hypothesis of zero rank, z t is stationary in levels (there is no cointegration). If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we test whether the rank of B is 1. If also this hypothesis is rejected, we test whether the rank of B is 2. This procedure is continued until a hypothesis is not reject or we test whether the rank of B is 6, which is the full rank of B:
In Table 8 panel (b) we show the results of the Johansen's cointegration analysis. We see that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector (rank (B) = 0) is strongly rejected.
Also r = 1; r = 2 and r = 3 are rejected; but r = 4 is not rejected, which suggests that there are three cointegrating vectors.
A.2 Construction of con…dence intervals
We compute con…dence intervals by implementing the following steps:
1. Bootstrap data-generating process 
(* denotes bootstrap data). When we use this method we rely on the regression model to obtain the correct conditional expectation, but we do not use the empirical distribution of errors. As discussed by MacKinnon (2007), in bootstrap hypothesis testing the data should be resampled under the null hypothesis.
2. We estimate the dominant …rm model using bootstrap data and use (14) to compute b j .
3. We construct the 99th percentile interval using the quantiles of the bootstrap sampling distribution of b : b 0:5% < < b 99:5% : (10), (11) and (13), using a nonlinear instrumental variable (NLIV) method. The third column shows the estimates for the competitive model, that is, (10), (11) and (12), using three-stage least squares (3SLS). The predetermined exogenous variables used in the models are V Notes: We use quarterly data from 1986:Q1-2009Q4. In the …rst OPEC core case, the dominant …rm consists of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar. Other countries that are OPEC members are assumed to be price takers with the same cost of production as an original fringe country. The second OPEC core case di¤ers from the …rst by assuming that cost of production of the new fringe consists of a weighted average of cost of production of a non-OPEC member and cost of production of an original OPEC member, with weights equal to production of non-OPEC countries and production of non-core OPEC countries relative to total fringe production. The heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are shown in parenthesis. This table reports estimates of elasticities and the market power index in the dominant …rm model when OPEC or OPEC-core is assumed to be the dominant …rm. Table (a) shows the ADF statistics with a drift and deterministic trend for the unit root process of each variable. The number of lags used is selected by the AIC and BIC index. The critical value of rejecting the null hypothesis at 5% level and the p-value of the statistics are presented.
The conclusion of the ADF test at 5% signi…cance level is listed. 
